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Environmental Ethics. From theory to practical change
This paper provides a critical presentation of parts of Anglo-American environmental ethics
from the perspective of the environmental crisis. Environmental ethics must attempt to
provide the theoretical basis for overcoming the crisis to which it responds. So I suggest a
possible connection of theory with practice by arguing that the meta-ethical approach to
normativity via an axiology of nature should be supported by a theory like deep ecology that
is dedicated to practical change. Naess’s notion of self-realization as an experiential process
of gradual identification with all life contains the insight that practical change begins with a
fundamental change of attitude.
Environmental  ethics  arose  during  the  1970s  as  a  philosophical  attempt  to  provide  a
theoretical foundation for a still growing criticism expressed in the public by scientists and
activists who envisioned a coming environmental crisis caused by increasing pollution and
depletion of natural resources in the world-wide growing industrial production. Especially in
the USA the destruction of great areas of the wilderness gave rise to critical considerations
about what many regarded as a cynical and thoughtless exploitation of unspoilt nature. The
growing environmental awareness of nature as a fragile and also beautiful and ingeniously
organized whole consisting of a variety of living species and ecosystems prompted many
philosophers to play man’s traditional instrumental attitude to nature off against the idea
that wilderness being a self-sustaining living and developing whole might be said to possess
value for itself, i.e. intrinsic value. Gradually the attitude arose that since nature – living and
sentient  beings  as  well  as  entire  biotic  communities  –  strife  for  self-preservation  and
development, it might deserve moral consideration as well as humans do for similar reasons.
Most environmental ethical theories argue that it  is a precondition for ascribing moral
consideration to nature that it be considered intrinsically valuable. In the 1970s and 80s the
discussions centered on mainly two different approaches. Along one path of the discussions
the arguments proposed implied a break with traditional anthropocentric ethics; an Anglo-
American analytical approach attempted to expand the scope of moral consideration from
humans to nature by means of meta-ethical considerations[1]. Attempting to formulate and
justify principles from which moral obligations towards nature could be logically deduced,
the followers of this path sought to construe an ontological axiology to determine what
classes of entities are worthy of moral consideration: should all organisms regardless of
complexity or just sentient beings, mammals or just primates, be considered worthy of
respect?  And  then,  what  about  whole  ecological  systems?  The  other  current  in
environmental ethics that also began in the 1970s counting representative as Naess and
Callicott gradually developed to comprise a variety of approaches that, though mutually
independent, share a common feature, namely the focus on practical change as an integrate
component of the theory. Earth First!,  Green Peace, ecofeminism, environmental virtue
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ethics, social ecology and deep ecology are all key words that signify an impatience that
many environmentalists felt with the apparent impotence of purely theoretical discussions.
The practically orientated movements that demanded instant change insisted that focus be
moved  from  academic  ethics  to  political  action  arguing  that  unless  the  industrially
developed,  western  countries  change  values  and  limits  their  high  degree  of  material
consumption and industrial production the whole world would not escape an environmental
crisis.
This paper partly supports the pragmatic action orientated trace by arguing that practical
change must be an integrate aspect of the ethical theory. On the individual level it must
imply a change of the self-understanding of man and his relation to nature and on the
societal level ethics must take into account that economic and political power relations
among social groups and nations (developed and developing) play a crucial role for the way
nature is treated. Instead of just formulating an axiology of natural being as a basis of moral
obligations a practical ethics must orient towards the attitudes directing the ways in which
individuals, states and societies treat their natural environment and relates to the third
world in trade and politics. Suggesting thus that a reflection on the intersubjective and
intercultural understanding – ultimately on the solidarity with all members of the global
community – is an important condition for the realization of abstract ethical principles I
argue  that  Naess’  notion  of  a  deep  ecology  that  involves  human  education  of  an
environmental attitude comes closest to a theory that incorporate practical change into
ethical  theory.  For  by  confronting  the  traditional  human  centered  ethics  his  theory
propounds a life-centered metaphysical holism combined with an egalitarian axiology that
include all its parts. It is Naess’s point that from these two principles two kinds of tasks are
possible. Firstly they imply an obligation to advance a certain attitude of the self towards
the other, i.e.  an ethical  demand that ecological self-realization is accomplished in and
through an identification of the individual with the whole life of the biosphere. Secondly the
principles  make  the  world  community  realized  that  it  is  necessary  to  develop  an
environmental global policy  that can accomplish these changes of attitude in ecological
practice.
In deep ecology a metaphysics that is orientated towards ethical and political practice thus
attempts  to  meet  the challenge of  the  crisis.  Deep ecology is  inspired by  world  wide
ecological  and  social  movements  whose  interest  it  is  to  further  sustainable  social,
economical and ecological relations. Due to their common holistic orientation they deny that
an extension of traditional human centered theories is theoretically adequate. Not only is
nature essentially different from man but it can disputed if there is basis for ascribing moral
value to natural individuals at all. In nature individuals do not count in the circle of life and
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therefore engagement – so the environmentalists – should address the task of taking care of
whole  life  communities.  The Land ethics  of  the first  holistic  environmentalists  in  USA
struggled for the protection of land areas, led as they were by ideals of ecological balance,
biodiversity and the flourishing of species in ecosystems. The classical figure in ecological
thinking, Aldo Leopold, once stated: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity,
stability and beauty of a biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise”[2]. Recent
environmental thinking, e.g. Callicott, Ferré and Rolston III, has been inspired by Leopold’s
ideas and base their theories on his distinction between basically two conflicting attitudes
towards nature. Leopold confronted the traditional economical paradigm with an alternative
ecological paradigm[3]. Against the ‘resourcism’ of the liberal tradition from Locke, the eco-
centrism of Leopold’s ‘land ethic’ spring from the experience that unspoilt natural areas –
the  wilderness  –  far  from  being  just  potential  material  for  human  manufacture,  in
themselves display a variety of interconnected life forms that are similar to human societies
in  ethical  respects.  As  ecosystems  they  too  form  complex  balanced  systems  with  a
sophisticated structure that express the way these life forms value their life and flourishing.
It is a crucial point in environmental theory that such ecosystems exist because they are
structures of life produced by individuals and species. That means that from an ethical point
of view Locke and traditional human centered ethics were wrong by considering unspoilt
nature just worthless matter. On the contrary, apart from possessing an aesthetical quality
due to the appeal of the harmonious unfolding of nature’s abundance to the senses of
humans,  the intrinsic values of  these life  systems – the fact  that they are valuable to
themselves – provide them with much more than just an instrumental, economic value to
human society. Consequently nature should not just be estimated from the point of view of
its utility to human society. On the contrary, human’s use of nature too should be valued
morally from the perspective of the interests that the species inhabiting the ecosystems
have. This moral dimension of the ecological paradigm originally proposed by Leopold arises
from the experience that humans belong to both a local and global natural environment in
and with which they live as a species among other species. Therefore the moral ‘right’ and
‘wrong’  among humans and between human and non-human nature  can no longer  be
founded on an anthropocentric ethics that grants human society unlimited freedom to use
nature as just a resource for human purposes. On the contrary, the highest end for a moral
and ethical endeavor must be a state of ecological balance between the life of the parts of
the ecosystems.
However, it can be argued that an life centered environmental ethics is confronted with
several theoretical difficulties. Firstly, moral consideration presupposes that its object exists
as an entity. Whether an ecosystem exists as an individual or is just a local area of living
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interconnected species, is a question that is based on the general metaphysical problem
about atomism and holism. In particular it concerns the ontological status of the whole.
Rolston seems to defend a ‘weak’ holism by arguing that strictly speaking only individuals
exist;  even the reality of species is questionable. An ecosystem forms – so Rolston – a
relatively stable identity of individuals that arise, live and perish, and it exist in a manner
similar to a burning flame that results from glowing particles. But even though a system is
not a substance itself it still possesses a duration like a substance in order to be able to
function as an instrumental condition for the life and reproduction of living species. It
exhibits a ‘creativity’ of the system – so Rolston – that is an ontological precondition for the
life and development of the species[4]. Therefore it is sensible to claim the existence of
ecosystems as object of moral consideration.
Against the weak holism of Rolston, a robust holism represented by e.g. Leopold, Callicott
and Naess[5] holds that an ecosystem actually forms  the species through the niches it
makes available for them. The formal properties of a single species – its shape and abilities –
are essentially caused by the place it fits into in the whole of the system. The system is not
just an aggregate of individuals, a result of their interconnectedness; it exhibits a stable
unity  that  determines  the  specific  properties  of  its  members.  But  whether  they  base
themselves on a weak or robust holism, eco-centered ethical theories that insist on raising
nature to the level of humans as regards moral value often face conflicts of interest among
species. In fact, ethical theories owe their existence to conflicts between such interests that
they are construed to solve. The egalitaristic biocentric theories that value homo sapiens as
a  species  among species  faces  examples  of  moral  conflicts  between humans and non-
humans and they all in practice seem to allow humans to trump animals’ interest to “satisfy
vital needs”[6]. When humans exceed other species in power and thus act as moral agents
towards nature they must administer the egalitarian principle in proportion to the pressure
of their own interests. And the fact that humans are capable of such morally conscious
considerations  towards  nature  makes  the  relation  between  humans  and  non-humans
asymmetrical. Rolston takes the consequence and approaches an anthropocentrism when he
ascribes unique value to the human person due to its consciousness, reason and freedom.
He even combines a Christian religious social ethic with a hierarchical life centered ethic
according to which man take a double position in the world as both a (natural) species
among species and as a being that transcends nature and is distinguished by rights and
obligations. Roughly speaking, the spiritual essence that rise man above nature imposes a
dignity  that  can  not  be  granted  to  natural  individuals  whose  essence  it  is  to  be  just
specimens of their species. It is a consequence of Rolston’s social ethics that only persons
possess unconditioned valuable. Against that, his biocentric ethics demands that humans let
nature  take  its  own course  in  matters  of  life  and  death.  Moral  consideration  is  thus
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addressed differently in social and in environmental relations.
Rolston’s distinction between social and life centered ethics has been criticized for laying
down  principles  for  two  normativities[7]  without  providing  higher  order  principles  to
determine the choice between them in situations of conflicts between human and non-
human interests. An answer to the critics could be that most biocentric theories consent to
the same practice. As mentioned previously, they hold an egalitarianism principle except in
situations where they estimate that humans have vital needs to satisfy. Notwithstanding the
dichotomy of the two normativities, Rolston tends to reconcile this apparent conflict by
pointing to the evolutionary aspect of the life of nature. He distinguishes between higher
and lower forms of biota; not just by referring to the degree of biological complexity but by
focusing on essential differences between in-animate matter, living beings, animals and
rational animals (humans). Evolution displays a historical development of the species that
corresponds  to  the  ontological  hierarchy  between  ‘higher’  and  ‘lower’  species.  The
‘intelligent’ distinction of the human being designates the point where the super-natural
appears within nature. By interpreting the evolution of nature as a diachronic realization of
the Great Chain of Being (lat. Scala Naturae) he can form the notion of a ‘creativity’ of eco-
systems that possesses the highest value in nature because it  is  the condition for the
development of its member species. The creativity of the system thus imposes on man a
special moral obligation to administer the nature that he is a part of. But still social ethics
with  its  religious  foundation  trump  the  obligation  towards  nature  when  vital  human
interests  come across the interests  of  natural  living species.  The fact  that  man is  the
‘highest’ creature of natural evolution grants unique rights to him.
Life-centered  environmental  ethics  thus  does  not  succeed  in  breaking  with  traditional
human  centered  ethics  on  the  egalitarianist  point  that  by  some  representatives  is
considered to follow from the denial of man’s exclusive role in the world. Natural evolution
might encompass man as a natural species among species and animals might be considered
intrinsic valuable because of their ability to value their life and environment. But that does
not change the fact that humans are metaphysically distinguished by being able to act
consciously towards nature, for instance from moral principles basing on knowledge.
Another and probably the most important problem that ‘academic’ environmental ethics
face is the gap between ethics and practice. Owing its existence to world wide growing
ecological  problems  environmental  ethical  theory  considers  itself  obliged  to  impede
destructive infringement of the substantial life of nature and to contribute to reestablishing
a balanced and sustainable life of human society with nature. The last part of my paper will
deal with the problem of connecting ethical theory to practical change. Life centered ethics
in particular claims to bridge the gap between the descriptive and normative by pointing to
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the ‘wisdom’ of the life of the ecosystem itself. From the process of the life community we
can learn about cooperation, balance, interconnectedness, symbiosis, i.e. about patterns
that can serve as principles for our interaction with the nature of which we are part. But the
realization of these ethical values faces difficulties because it both presupposes profound
changes of our personal character and of the economical and industrial interests of society.
Can ethical theory contribute to bridging this gap? Firstly, there is an internal gap in ethics,
a leap from rational insight to a change in practical change. Secondly, even if a theory is
successful  implying  morally  obliging  principles  by  means  of  logical  arguments,  it  is
questionable if reason or insight will be powerful enough to shape the individual person by
environmental virtues and to motivate the public to demand a policy that brings about the
necessary societal changes.
As regards the internal problem in ethics itself, Callicott has attempted to bridge the gap
between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ in his philosophical underpinning of Leopold’s theory by arguing
that an evolutionary perspective on ecological science implies an extension of social ethics
to encompass the whole biotic community[8]. By means of a comparison of Darwin’s theory
of evolution with Hume ‘s moral theory he sees a affiliation between the social liberation
movements in Western history and the development of altruism in nature. In nature – says
Darwin – the self-limitation of biota in favour of the community has proved advantageous in
natural selection since the community functions as a security for the individual. Thus apart
from the egoistic struggle for life, social affection and symbiotic life forms are tendencies in
the life and behaviour of biota. And just like in nature social affection becomes extended to
address more individuals as the community of interdependent biota is gradually extended
(from family to tribe and nation), so human – especially Western – societies in a similar way
have experienced how liberation movements have struggled to encompass still more groups
during the development of the world society. For instance human rights means that morals
and rights are no longer limited to certain groups but to every human being. Callicott
suggests  that  the  struggle  for  animal  rights  in  the  present  age  is  a  step  toward
incorporating biota, including eco-systems, in the moral community due to the experience of
their importance for the global human society.
However, the question remains how the evolutionary development of the social affection
relates to moral normativity. Not only Darwin addresses altruism descriptively; also Hume,
whom Callicott  uses  to  underpin  Darwin’s  empirically  based  theory,  deals  with  moral
psychology.  Hume’s  theory  is  intended  to  explain  the  foundation  of  moral  actions  as
grounded in inclination and not in reason wherefore he explicitly abstains from laying down
moral prescriptions. Therefore it must be concluded that his theory of ‘public affection’,
though supported by Darwin’s theory of evolution, is too weak to deliver exhortations and
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instructions to moral actions.
Maybe  the  strongest  attempt  in  academic  environmental  ethics  to  challenge  the
anthropocentric ideology of resourcism is Rolston’s theory. According to Rolston the value
of  nature  does  not  depend  on  humans  producing  value  of  a  raw  worth-less  material
(minerals, soil, oil, water, etc.) by manufacturing it. When we experience unspoilt nature we
see  organisms,  animals,  ecosystems  and  ultimately  the  planet  Earth  as  relatively
autonomous individuals and systems. Living beings have a good of their own and as such
they  value  their  own  life  as  intrinsically  good  and  their  environment  instrumentally.
Rolston’s ethical point is that nature has value independently of humans’ making value of it.
Animals are “able to value” and as such they are “value-able”[9]. He rejects axiological
subjectivism and defends an axiology grounded on ontology, claiming that nature, valuing
itself, imposes its value and therefore obligations upon us. But also eco-systems, though
strictly speaking they are not individuals,  are kinds of communities that – as unities –
exhibits a creativity which makes the condition for the life, form and flourishing of the single
species. They produce value to their member species. Rolston is affected by the picture of
the earth take from the space, this blue-white planet with its beauty and varieties human
and non-human life forms. The view of the earth from space produced by NASA in 1968
presented a fantastic spectacle of a living “value-able” planet but also a fragile system of life
which makes it morally considerable as an object of care.
But it is doubtful whether an experience and understanding of nature as a life totality with a
history where value is realized make a sufficient ethical foundation for imposing moral
responsibility on humans. Valuing nature properly according to Rolston’s standard seems to
keep the valuing subject in a purely theoretical attitude. The contemplative feature that
Rolston’s ontological axiology occasions, is expressed in his statement that we realize the
moral considerability of nature on the basis of an understanding that consists in “joining
ongoing  planetary  natural  history  in  which  there  is  value  wherever  there  is  positive
creativity”[10]. But bearing in mind the Aristotelian distinction between on the one hand
contemplative  and  on  the  other  hand  practical,  action  orientated  virtues  it  might  be
necessary to shift focus from objectivity (axiology) to the “value-able” subjectivity. Actions
that  aim  at  profound  changes  of  social  and  economic  structures  to  solve  global
environmental problems arise from strong ecological motivations and they presuppose that
a policy be formed by citizens who concentrate their efforts – individually and socially – to
change their self-understanding and ethical and aesthetical values. Subjectivity transforms
insight to action. How can contemplation of nature lead to change of human practice?
Naess’s  idea  of  self-realization  as  a  unification  of  the  individual  with  the  biospheric
community is a suggestion for how a philosophical knowledge can be combined with a
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change of attitude towards nature that can lead to action. His ‘deep ecology’ is dedicated to
action; as mentioned above, it is a theory that arise as a response to the crisis of the natural
environment. Its very existence is a sign of crisis and conversely its possible dissolution
together with the environmental movement that it is closely associated with, would mean a
victory for the good cause, namely accomplish a global ecological balance. Furthermore the
interdisciplinary character of deep ecology – joining philosophy, religion, social and natural
sciences – reflects an awareness of how complex the cause is: It implies both exploring the
causes of the crisis and gaining insight in the (spiritual) ideals to be realized to solve the
problems. Natural and social sciences as well as speculative philosophy and religion are
needed – so Naess – in order to understand the roots of the crisis and to show the way out of
it.
Deep ecology rests on a life-centered idea of everything being ‘interconnected’ and mutual
dependent in a common universal biospheric life. Against the atomism and mechanicism of
traditional scientific thinking Naess claims that entities are not separate but formed by their
relations; relation is ontologically prior to the relata. It follows from this fact that separation
is  wrong and cooperation is  good.  Symbiosis  designates  the experience of  how life  is
promoted and enhanced both intersubjectively and in the relation between man and nature.
The highest good of deep ecology would be a state of the biosphere where every single
entity is included in a joint cause of promoting the flourishing of life on earth with the
highest degree of specific diversity.
Deep ecology combines the above-sketched metaphysical holism with a principle of self-
realization. This focus on subjectivity has been regarded a corrective to the traditional
academic attempts that base environmental ethics on axiology because it allegedly stresses
the importance of  a “psychological  awakening” of  humans in contrast to just  a logical
approach that deduce moral  obligation from rules derived from axiology.  Warwick Fox
suggests a Freudian model to explain the “psychological” change necessary for a sound
realization of the right ecological attitude[11]. The aim is that the ego learns to administer
the  conflicting  tendencies  of  the  self  between  the  desire  (lat.  id)  and  the  normative-
judgmental super-ego in a balanced behavior towards the environment. But the problem
with this psychological approach is that it does not capture the structure of the self-relation
being dependent on the relation  to the world. More precisely, by self-realization Naess
means a process of enlightenment that humans – individually and collectively – enter into
through a gradually evolving experience of being identical with other beings in a common
unified life totality. The identity aimed at, is based on both sensitivity, empathy toward
living organism, on a social understanding of (sub-)cultures and on spiritual experiences of
being one with the universal life process. In self-realization the boundaries of the individual
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self is dissolved in the greater Self of a life totality, the “atman” (individual self) undergoes a
change to the Atman (the cosmic self)”[12].
The  process  of  self-realization  thus  involves  a  knowledge  attained  through  practical
involvement with the world. The ethics of deep ecology combines theory and practice; it
develops its normative principles from ideas of metaphysical holism (e.g. relation-is-prior-to-
relata;  interconnectedness;  egalitarianism;  symbiosis;  flourishing).  It  derives  its  moral
obligation from the idea of mutual dependence of human and non-human life that imposes
responsible actions. Furthermore, deep ecology stresses the importance of a change of the
whole human character by harmonizing the inner conflicting tendencies of  reason and
desire.  Therefore  academic  ethical  theory’s  focus  on  rationality  (on  logically  binding
principles for action) should be extended to influence the volitional aspect of human nature
since the subjects of concrete actions are whole persons and not just thinking subjects. The
‘ecological field worker’ understands that actions originates from the authentic will of the
whole person and that abstract, logical reason needs to be challenged by experiences of the
immense diversity of both human and non-human life forms. Cognition as an understanding
that subsumes and reduces the sensuous manifold to abstract concepts seems to advance a
self-consciousness that separates it from its objects. Against the traditional metaphysical
and epistemological tradition the ecological field worker makes a virtue of approaching the
diversity of  the world with sympathy and he imposes the epistemic task on himself  to
understand the world by experiencing himself as being identical with it in taking part in one
and the same life process with it.
Self-realization as enlightenment that forms the personal character does not only serve as a
condition  for  identifying  with  natural  life.  Since  deep  ecology  aims  at  furthering  the
integrity  of  universal  life  it  addresses human society as well.  The ideals  of  biospheric
balance,  symbiosis  and  flourishing,  include  an  encounter  with  social  and  economic
inequalities between groups, cultures and nations. Disparity between rich and poor together
with oppressing power relations characterizes a world of boundaries among humans and
between  humans  and  non-human  nature.  Separation  causes  conflict,  struggle  and
destruction of human life and of the environment. The environmental problems first strikes
the poor nations but it gradually turns out to be a global matter changing the life conditions
of all people. Therefore a real condition for a substantial change is a concerted effort of all
nations; this cooperation implies a unification of mankind that bases on mutual recognition,
economical and political equalization. And the will to realize the political changes that is
needed for that cause rests upon an experience of belonging to one and the same life
totality. So deep ecology combines a realistic sense of and dedication to solve the global
environmental  problems  with  a  strong  foundation  in  a  life-centered  ‘academic’  ethical
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theory. As a movement it understands itself as a response to the environmental crisis and as
an ethic based on a holistic metaphysics it claims to possess the theoretical toolbox for
overcoming the crisis.
However, it is my conviction that the egalitarianism of Naess’s theory must be corrected;
the  fact  that  humans’  treatment  of  nature  is  conscious,  implies  that  ethics  inevitably
consists in an asymmetrical relation between humans and nature that does not allow for
egalitarianism. If this inequality does not lead to anthropocentrism, at least it seems to
speak in favor of  a hierarchical  biocentrism of a Rolston who operates with a twofold
normativity of a social and an environmental ethics respectively. The new and distinctive
feature of environmental ethics is its predominantly holistic – or systemic – orientation.
Individualistic theories such as the animal liberation and well-fare ethics of Singer and
Regan just extend traditional ethical theories – utilitarianism and deontology – to apply to
animals since animals – the arguments say- are equal to humans, being capable as they are
of suffering and of having a life and a good own their own[13]. But an isolated moral
consideration for individual animals is problematic because it ignores the balance of the
biotic  community.  From a  holistic  orientated  point  of  view liberation  of  domesticated
animals would be wrong because it would threaten the ecological balance of the biotic
community. Not only for this reason but also due to the experience that environmental
problems  do  not  know  borders  since  biota  are  parts  of  ecosystems  and  these  again
integrated in the entire biosphere of the planet Earth, the focus of the environmental view
on nature needs to be extended from addressing just individuals (animals) to comprise
whole ecosystems and ultimately the entire biosphere. Environmental ethics is essentially
life centered.
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